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Under section 1123(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, when confirming a plan of 
reorganization, it is well established that all claimants are required to receive equality of 
treatment, meaning that “all class members receive equal value and pay the same consideration 
in exchange for their distributions.”2 Yet, multiple courts have held that this does not mean that 
all claimants are required to receive equality of result.3 Section 1123(a)(4) is satisfied “if 
claimants in the same class have the same opportunity to recover.”4 This means that if a plan 
subjects all members of the same class to the same means of claim determination, it is sufficient 
to satisfy the requirements of section 1123(a)(4).5   
 “The key inquiry under § 1123(a)(4) is not whether all of the claimants in a class obtain 
the same thing, but whether they have the same opportunity.”6 In In re Dana Corp., a portion of 
the claimant’s in a particular class reached settlement agreements with the debtor, and as a result, 
they received far less than their full claims, while those who did not settle did receive their full 
claims.7 Yet, the court held that the chapter 11 plan did not violate section 1123(a)(4) even 
though the claimants did not agree to less favorable treatment, because all the claimants in the 
same class had the same opportunity to settle their claims.8  
Additionally, a reorganization plan that implemented a lottery system that would divide 
all of the creditors into seven classes and established “a mandatory redemption schedule under 
                                               
2 In re Breitburn Energy Partners LP, 582 B.R. 321, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
3 See id; In re W.R. Grace & Co., 729 F.3d 311, 327 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[C]ourts have interpreted the ‘same treatment’ 
requirement to mean that all claimants in a class must have ‘the same opportunity’ for recovery.”); In re Central 
Med. Ctr., Inc., 122 B.R. 568, 574 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990).   
4 See In re Breitburn, 582 B.R. at 358. 
5 See In re Central Med., 122 B.R. at 575. 
6 See Ad Hoc Committee of Personal Injury Asbestos Claimants v. Dana Corp., (In re Dana Corp.), 412 B.R. 53, 62 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
7 See id. 
8 See id; In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litigation, 982 F.2d 721, 749 (2d Cir.1992) (“the ‘same 
treatment’ standard of section 1123(a)(4) does not require that all claimants within a class receive the same amount 
of money.”). 
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which a given number of bonds are randomly selected by the trustee to be redeemed each year” 
has also been found to satisfy the requirements of Section 1123(a)(4).9 To elaborate, under this 
lottery system the creditors who were chosen first would receive a more favorable interest rate 
than those bondholders chosen to be paid later and therefore they would receive different 
amounts of money.10 However, the court found that section1123(a)(4) simply requires that a plan 
subject class members to the same process for claim satisfaction, not that the process must yield 
the same pecuniary result for each class member.11  
 Accordingly, while it is well established that members of a certain class do not have to 
receive the same compensation under a reorganization plan, they must be subject to the same 
process in determining that compensation.  
II. Circuit Courts find that Reorganization Plan may Treat Certain Creditors More 
Favorable Without Violating Section 1123(a)(4). 
 
An issue of interpretation arises when certain class members are treated better than others 
because they have provided some new form of consideration in exchange for that better 
treatment. Because the Supreme Court has never defined what exactly equal treatment requires 
under the Bankruptcy Code, and because the Bankruptcy Code itself has never provided a 
standard for equal treatment, this is the question that the circuit courts are beginning to address 
and create a standard for.12 Under this interpretation, a reorganization plan does not violate 
section 1123(a)(4) if it treats creditors within the same class differently if that favorable 
treatment is in exchange for a “valuable new commitment” by the creditor.13 The Second, Fifth, 
                                               
9 In re Central Med., 122 B.R. at 574. 
10 See id. 
11 See id. at 575 (“[T]he Plan affords all bondholders the opportunity to participate in the same random lottery 
system. The fact that some may ultimately receive more money than others is merely a consequence of a system that 
was applied equally to all members of that class.”). 
 
12 In re Peabody Energy Corporation, 933 F.3d 918, 925 (8th Cir. 2019); Ahuja, 644 F. App'x at 24; In re Cajun, 150 
F.3d at 503; In re Acequia, 787 F.2d at 1352. 
13 See In re Peabody, 933 F.3d at 925. 
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Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have found that it is in fact possible for a plan to treat certain creditors 
more favorable without violating the equal treatment rule.  
One way a creditor may provide “valuable new commitment” to satisfy this standard is if 
it had a secured claim separate from its equity interest.14 For example, in the Second Circuit, the 
court addressed the question of whether a plan of reorganization violated the equal treatment 
standard where senior creditors were paid more than their claims were worth and found that the 
plan was permissible. The Court held that there was no violation because the senior creditors that 
were treated more favorably had not received that extra value in the reorganization for its 
common equity interests, “but rather for its secured claim against LightSquared Inc. and the 
causes of action against third parties that it agreed to attribute to reorganized LightSquared.”15 
So, because the equity holder had a secured claim separate from its equity interest and had 
agreed to attribute to the reorganized debtor “certain causes of action against third parties,” it 
was permissible that they were treated more favorably than other equity holders within their 
class.16 
The Fifth and Ninth Circuit have both held similarly in cases going as far back as 1986.17 
The Ninth Circuit established that if a claimant in a particular class is receiving preferential 
treatment over other claimants in the class, the inequality is permissible as long as the treatment 
is the result of something other than her ownership interest as a shareholder.18 In In re Acequia, 
Inc., the reorganization plan classified two separate shareholders in the same class but denied 
only one of those shareholders the right to “participate in management of the Debtor as an officer 
or director.”19 The less favored shareholder argued that this restriction on his shares violated the 
                                               
14 See Ahuja, 644 F. App'x at 24. 
15 See id. at 29. 
16 See id. 
17 See In re Cajun, 150 F.3d 503; In re Acequia, 787 F.2d 1352. 
18 See In re Acequia, 787 F.2d at 1363. 
19 Id. at 1362. 
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equal treatment rule, but the Ninth Circuit found otherwise. The Court found that because the 
shareholder’s “position as director and officer of the Debtor is separate from her position as an 
equity security holder” and the preferential treatment was tied to her service to the debtor as a 
director and officer of the debtor, rather than to her ownership interest as a shareholder, the 
preferential treatment was permissible.20  
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has found reimbursement of expenses incurred in a 
bankruptcy case to the claimants is enough to permit favorable treatment of certain claimants.21 
In In re Cajun, the court found that even though the debtor made additional payments to one 
claimant resulting in a more favorable treatment, “the payments were not made in satisfaction of 
the … members' claims against Cajun, but rather as reimbursement for plan and litigation 
expenses incurred in the bankruptcy case.”22 So, because the payments were made for a purpose 
other than to satisfy the claimants claims against the debtor, the favorable treatment was 
permissible.  
The Eighth Circuit is the most recent circuit court to adopt this interpretation of the equal 
treatment rule. In In re Peabody, the Eighth Circuit seemed to summarize the fellow circuits 
interpretations and create a more clear-cut rule, in holding that “a reorganization plan may treat 
one set of claim holders more favorably than another so long as the treatment is not for the claim 
but for distinct, legitimate rights or contributions from the favored group separate from the 
claim.”23 In doing so, the Eighth Circuit distinguished In re Peabody from Lasalle, where the 
Supreme Court “rejected a reorganization plan that gave a debtor’s prebankruptcy equity holders 
the exclusive opportunity to receive ownership interests in the reorganized debtor if the equity 
                                               
20 See id. at 1363. 
21 See In re Cajun, 150 F.3d at 518. 
22 See id. 
23 In re Peabody, 933 F.3d at 925. 
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holders would invest new money in the reorganized debtor.”24 In distinguishing LaSalle, the 
Eighth Circuit seemingly laid out three essential criteria that must be met in order to satisfy § 
1123(a)(4).25 First, the claimant that is treated less favorably must not be excluded from any 
opportunity that is afforded to the claimant that receive preferential treatment. Second, the 
creditors that receive preferential treatment must give up something of value in exchange for said 
preferential treatment. Finally, the debtor must consider alternative ways to raise capital other 
than through providing preferential treatment.26 For these reasons, the Eighth Circuit found that 
Lasalle does not imply that there are no circumstances under which a plan may treat claimants 
differently within the same class.  
CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding that under  section 1123(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, a plan of 
reorganization must “provide the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class, 
unless the holder of a particular claim or interest agrees to a less favorable treatment of such 
particular claim or interest,” the circuit courts are beginning to carve out a way for debtors to 
provide certain creditors with special treatment. The Eighth Circuit has laid out the three 
requirements that are needed to satisfy the requirement under this developing interpretation: (1) 
the claimant that is treated less favorably must not be excluded from any opportunity that is 
afforded to the claimant that receive preferential treatment; (2) the creditors that receive 
preferential treatment must give up something of value in exchange for said preferential 
treatment; and (3) the debtor must consider alternative ways to raise capital other than through 
providing preferential treatment.27  
                                               
24 See id.; Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 526 U.S. 434, 
456 (1999). 
25 See In re Peabody, 933 F.3d at 926. 
26 See id. 
27 See id. 
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